Conditional accuracy in response interference tasks: Evidence from the Eriksen flanker task and the spatial conflict task. by Stins, J.F. et al.
409
http://www.ac-psych.org
Conditional accuracy in response 
interference tasks: Evidence from the 
Eriksen ﬂanker task and the spatial conﬂict
task
John F. Stins1,2, Tinca J. C. Polderman1, Dorret I. Boomsma1, and Eco J. C. de 
Geus1
1 Department of Biological Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
2 Research Institute MOVE, Faculty of Human Movement Sciences, VU University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Keywords
response interference, sequential analysis, accuracy, Simon task, ﬂanker
2007 • volume 3 • no 3 • 409-417
Received 10.11.2006
                      Accepted 21.06.2007
Correspondence address: John F. Stins, Faculty of Human 
Movement Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorst-
straat 9, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Phone: ++ 
31 (20) 598 8543. E-mail: j.stins@fbw.vu.nl
INTRODUCTION
Response interference refers to the ﬁnding that perform-
ance deteriorates when a dominant response has to be 
suppressed in order to give the alternate (instructed) 
response, relative to the condition in which the dominant 
response and the activated response are the same. An 
often-studied paradigm is the Eriksen ﬂanker task (e.g., 
Eriksen & Schultz, 1979), where subjects have to re-
spond to a central target ﬂanked by distractors, usually
arrows or letters. When the target arrow and the ﬂank-
ing arrows all point in the same direction (when they are 
congruent), reaction time is shorter and performance is 
more accurate than when the target arrow points in a 
different direction than the ﬂanking arrows, that is, they
are incongruent.
 The current study is motivated by a study of Gratton, 
Coles, and Donchin (1992), who investigated RT and ac-
curacy in the Eriksen ﬂanker task. They suggested that
stimulus processing takes place in two phases: ﬁrst, a
brief “quick and dirty” parallel phase, during which all 
stimulus elements (including the ﬂankers) are processed
in parallel, followed by a second, more elaborate, focused 
phase, in which subjects select a particular location in 
ABSTRACT
Two well-known response interference tasks are 
the Eriksen ﬂanker task and the spatial conﬂict
task. The tasks are logically equivalent, and com-
parable effects of current and previous stimu-
lus type (congruent or incongruent) have been 
shown with regard to reaction time (RT). Here, 
we investigated whether interference and se-
quential trial effects also had comparable effects 
on accuracy. We speciﬁcally tested whether these
effects interacted with the speed of responding 
using conditional accuracy functions (CAFs). The 
CAFs revealed that in both tasks congruency and 
sequential trial effects on accuracy are found only 
in trials with fast responses (< 600 ms). Sequen-
tial trial effects on accuracy were weaker for the 
ﬂanker task than for the spatial conﬂict task. In
very fast trials (< 400 ms) response activation by 
distracting ﬂankers led to below-chance perform-
ance in the ﬂanker task, but response activation
by incongruent spatial location did not lead to 
below-chance performance in the spatial conﬂict
task. The pattern of results hints at subtle dif-
ferences in processing architecture between the 
tasks. 
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the visual ﬁeld for further processing. During the focused
phase subjects inhibit (to some extent) the inﬂuence of
the ﬂankers on response selection. Support for this two-
phase model comes from so-called conditional accuracy 
functions (CAFs), in which the accuracy for a given trial 
type is plotted as a function of RT. For very short RTs (< 
250 ms) performance on incongruent trials was below 
chance, but as RTs increased, accuracy for this type of 
trial quickly rose to near perfect levels. Performance on 
congruent trials, in contrast, was at near-perfect levels 
of accuracy for each RT-value. This pattern of results 
suggests a strategy whereby subjects sometimes re-
spond on the basis of evidence accumulated in the paral-
lel phase (i.e., the identity of the ﬂanker elements) and
sometimes on the basis of evidence accumulated in the 
focused phase (i.e., the identity of the target). If sub-
jects respond mainly on the basis of the identity of the 
ﬂankers, their accuracy will be near-perfect on congru-
ent trials, but well below chance on incongruent trials, 
because on these trials the ﬂankers signal the alternate
response.1 
 Moreover, Gratton et al. (1992) found that this pat-
tern of results was modulated by the previous trial type, 
in that the dip below chance level for incongruent trials 
only reached statistical signiﬁcance when the previous
trial was congruent, as opposed to another incongruent 
one. Speciﬁcally, there appears to be an advantage (as
evidenced by more accurate performance) for congruent 
trials preceded by congruent trials (cC), and incongruent 
trials preceded by incongruent trials (iI) relative to cI 
and iC transitions. In other words, congruency repeti-
tion yields somewhat more accurate performance than 
congruency change. This pattern of results was essen-
tially mirrored in the RT data. Apparently, subjects are 
more likely to resort to a parallel processing strategy if 
they had just encountered a congruent trial. This was 
explained by Gratton et al. (1992) by assuming that sub-
jects changed the emphasis given to the evidence gained 
during each of the two phases. This change in empha-
sis is unintentional and varies on a trial-to-trial basis, 
so that after a congruent trial subjects are more likely 
to respond on the basis of evidence gained during the 
parallel phase. If, in contrast, they had just encountered 
an incongruent trial, subjects are more likely to respond 
somewhat more cautiously, and base their response on 
evidence gained during the focused phase. 
 These so-called sequential dependency effects 
have been observed in several studies, both in terms 
of speed and in terms of accuracy of performance (e.g., 
Nieuwenhuis, Stins, Posthuma, Polderman, Boomsma, & 
de Geus, 2006). Similar patterns of results have been 
obtained using a closely related task: the spatial con-
ﬂict task. The spatial conﬂict task (sometimes called the
Simon task, e.g., Simon & Rudell, 1967; for a review see 
Simon, 1990) is based on the ﬁnding that when a stimu-
lus and a response are spatially congruent (e.g., left 
hand response to a stimulus presented in the left visual 
ﬁeld or to the left ear), RTs are shorter and responses
are more accurate relative to when they are incongruent 
(e.g., one is left and the other is right). For example, if 
a left response has to be given to a high-pitched tone, 
and a right response to a low-pitched tone, RT is shorter 
and performance is more accurate when the emitted re-
sponse is on the same side as the stimulated ear. In this 
design, location of the stimulus (in this example, the ear 
stimulated) is a task-irrelevant stimulus property, that 
is, uncorrelated with the identity of the stimulus (in this 
example, the pitch). This interference effect (or Simon 
effect) is usually attributed to an automatic activation of 
the response on the same side as the stimulated side. 
Sequential dependency effects on RT and on error rate 
have also been demonstrated in the spatial conﬂict task 
(Valle-Inclán, Hackley, & de Labra, 2002; Valle-Inclán, 
Hackley, & MacClay, 1998).
 The spatial conﬂict task and the Eriksen ﬂanker
task are logically equivalent, in that in both tasks (a) 
subjects have to respond to one task-relevant stimulus 
attribute and try to suppress responding to the other 
task-irrelevant attribute, (b) the task-irrelevant attribute 
is sometimes congruent and sometimes incongruent 
with the instructed response, (c) the task-relevant and 
task-irrelevant attributes are uncorrelated, and (d) trial 
congruency varies on a trial-to-trial basis.
 However, despite these similarities important dif-
ferences remain, especially as regards differences in 
information processing architecture. First, one difference 
concerns the nature of the attentional movements in 
both tasks. In the ﬂanker task, upon stimulus presenta-
tion attention has to “zoom in” from a higher-order to a 
lower-order level of representation, that is, attention has 
to focus on the target (for a more thorough treatment of 
this issue, see Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Stoffer, 1991). 
In the Simon task, in contrast, attention has to make 
a lateral (same-level) shift to the imperative stimulus. 
These different types of attentional movements may 
have implications for the temporal dynamics of stimulus 
code formation (Stoffer, 1991). Second, in the spatial 
conﬂict task, the task-relevant and task-irrelevant fea-
tures belong to different perceptual dimensions, for 
example color and location. These stimulus features 
are processed along separate channels (this is known 
as dual-route processing). It is widely assumed that 
stimulus identity is processed along a controlled route, 
whereas location is processed automatically along an un-
Conditional accuracy
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conditional route. In the Eriksen ﬂanker task, in contrast,
the ﬂow of information proceeds along the same channel
(see also Wendt, Kluwe, & Peters, 2006). Related to this, 
the information of the ﬂankers outweighs the informa-
tion of the target because the ﬂanker information consti-
tutes more visual elements (usually four) than the target 
(one). As such, information processed in the parallel 
phase tends to be dominated by the ﬂankers (Gratton 
et al., 1992). Finally, in the ﬂanker task the target arrow
on a given trial may become a distractor arrow on the 
next trial, which may give rise to a mechanism of nega-
tive priming (e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Ullsperger, 
Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005), whereas negative priming is 
unlikely in the spatial conﬂict task.
 The differences between the tasks, in turn, have led 
to different accounts of sequential dependency effects in 
the respective tasks. In a nutshell, sequential dependen-
cies in the Eriksen ﬂanker task have traditionally been
explained by the conﬂict-control loop theory, according to
which the response conﬂict induced by the incongruency
between target and ﬂankers on trial n leads to a tempo-
rary increase in cognitive control on trial n+1, resulting 
effectively in a reduction of ﬂanker interference follow-
ing incongruent trials (e.g., Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
Carter, & Cohen, 1999). However, more recently it was 
argued that sequential effects in the ﬂanker task can in
effect be explained by the subset of trials that exhibit ex-
act stimulus-response repetitions  (Mayr, Ahw, & Laurey, 
2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006), so that a mechanism 
of associative priming may account for the sequential 
dependency effect. With respect to the spatial conﬂict
task it is generally assumed that sequential dependency 
effects arise within the context of a dual-route model of 
information processing. According to this model, identity 
of the target (e.g., its shape or color) is processed along 
an intentional control route that in effect realizes the 
task instruction. The task-irrelevant stimulus attribute 
(i.e., its location) is processed in an automatic fashion 
along the unconditional route and directly activates the 
ipsilateral response. Within this model, sequential de-
pendency effects are explained by selective gating and/
or suppression of these routes as a function of the con-
gruency level of the preceding stimulus, leading to trial-
by-trial changes in activation that bias processing of the 
current trial (e.g., Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, 
& Sommer, 2002). However, this account was recently 
challenged by Hommel and coworkers (e.g., Hommel, 
Proctor, & Lu, 2004), who favor a so-called feature in-
tegration account. According to this account there is a 
processing advantage for trial sequences involving exact 
stimulus-response repetitions (same identity and same 
location) and trial sequences where both the stimulus 
and the response alternate (different identity and differ-
ent position) relative to where just one of the stimulus 
attributes changes and the other remains the same. This 
processing advantage in effect leads to an advantage of 
cC trials over iC trials, and iI trials over cI trials, both in 
terms of speed and in terms of accuracy.
 So there is considerable interest in sequential de-
pendency effects in both tasks, and in the extent to which 
they share similarities in their information processing 
architectures. But to our knowledge no direct tests have 
been performed comparing sequential effects in both 
tasks within the same subject group. The aim of this 
study is to directly compare accuracy scores obtained 
with both tasks, regarding (a) repetition effects and (b) 
the dynamics of direct activation. With respect to repeti-
tion effects, sequential dependency effects on RT have 
been repeatedly demonstrated in both tasks (see above), 
although the effect seems to be somewhat stronger in the 
spatial conﬂict task than in the ﬂanker task. In this study
we test whether a comparable pattern of sequential trial 
effects can be found for the accuracy data in both tasks, 
and whether sequential dependency effects on accuracy 
are indeed stronger in the spatial conﬂict task than the
ﬂanker task. Our second interest – temporal dynamics of
direct activation – will be investigated using the CAFs as 
described above. By constructing CAFs for both tasks, it 
becomes possible to examine whether the time course 
of activation of task relevant and task irrelevant stimulus 
attributes in the spatial conﬂict task is comparable to
the time courses of activation in the ﬂanker task. More
speciﬁcally, we will test whether in the spatial conﬂict
task subjects will base their fast responses not on the 
identity of the stimulus but on its left or right location. If 
this is so, then we expect to ﬁnd below-chance accuracy
for the very fast incongruent spatial conﬂict trials, just as
was found for the ﬂanker task.
 To this end we reanalyzed a set of ﬂanker data pub-
lished in Nieuwenhuis et al. (2006). In their Experiments 
1 to 5 an attempt was made to disentangle associative 
stimulus-response priming from conﬂict-driven adapta-
tions in cognitive control in the ﬂanker task. The sub-
ject group in their Experiment 5 (but not the other ex-
periments) consisted of a large number of monozygotic 
twins, dizygotic twins, and their siblings, with a mean 
age of 12 years. The children were recruited from the 
Netherlands Twin Register  (Boomsma, 1998).2
 The current study differs in three regards from 
Experiment 5 in the Nieuwenhuis et al. (2006) study. 
First, that study asked a theoretical question that was 
quite different from ours, namely whether sequential trial 
effects are due to (low level) priming, or due to (top-down 
driven) adaptations in cognitive control. However, in the 
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present study, the emphasis is on the temporal dynam-
ics of activation. Second, the Nieuwenhuis et al. (2006) 
study looked only at performance on the ﬂanker task,
whereas in the current study we also analyzed Simon 
data (not reported in Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006), which 
permits a direct comparison between the processing ar-
chitecture of the tasks for the reasons outlined above. 
Third, in Experiment 5 of Nieuwenhuis et al. (2006) the 
experimental group consisted of twins. However, it could 
be the case that pairs of twins (especially monozygotic 
ones) are alike in their performance, so that strictly 
speaking the observations are not independent. To that 
end, we decided to randomly select one twin from each 
pair and analyze only those data.
METHOD
Participants
The subject group consisted of 137 12-year-old children. 
Although this age group is younger than the subject 
groups often used in experimental psychology (usually 
ﬁrst-year undergraduates), there is evidence that at this
age cognitive functions such as attentional control have 
already reached maturity (e.g., Ridderinkhof, van der 
Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997). The children were all 
twins and were randomly selected from a group of 137 
pairs of twins, so as to exclude possible high phenotypic 
intercorrelations. Pairs of twins were ﬁrst asked in writ-
ing whether they were willing to participate in the study. 
Permission was also asked of the parents or guardians. 
If permission was granted, the families received further 
information on the study and were invited to come to the 
campus site to do the tests. On the day of testing, both 
the children and their parents or legal representatives 
signed an informed consent form.
Procedure
The children performed a range of neuropsychological 
tests that were administered in the same order. Short 
breaks were given between tests. The entire session 
lasted approximately 4 hrs per child. The spatial conﬂict
task and the Eriksen ﬂanker task were performed on a
computer. Subjects were seated in front of a computer 
monitor and a panel of two response buttons (left and 
right). The monitor and the response buttons were ap-
proximately aligned with the vertical meridian of each 
participant’s body.
 In the spatial conﬂict task subjects were ﬁrst
presented with a white ﬁxation cross for 500 ms.
Immediately after the cross had disappeared a red or a 
green disk (1.9 cm in diameter) appeared for 500 ms, 
either left or right from ﬁxation. The distance between
the ﬁxation cross and the inner edge of the disk was
2.5 cm. Stimulus color and stimulus location were uncor-
related. Subjects were instructed to press the left key in 
response to a green disk and the right key in response 
to a red disk, regardless of stimulus location. Subjects 
received a total of 120 trials (60 red stimuli and 60 green 
stimuli) in random order. Half of each stimulus type was 
presented left, and the other half was presented right. 
The trials on which the stimulus location happens to be 
on the same side as the required response are the con-
gruent trials; the other trials are the incongruent ones. 
Prior to the experiment subjects received 12 practice 
trials that were not analyzed. The spatial conﬂict task
lasted approximately 10 min.
 In the Eriksen ﬂanker task subjects were ﬁrst pre-
sented with a white ﬁxation cross for 500 ms, which was
immediately followed by a horizontal array of ﬁve equally
sized and spaced white arrows for 800 ms. The array was 
10.5 cm wide. Subjects were instructed to attend to the 
central arrow and ignore the four ﬂankers. Subjects were
to press the left key for a left facing central arrow and 
the right key for a right facing central arrow. The ﬂanking
arrows either all pointed in the same direction as the 
target arrow (e.g., “< < < < <”), or they all pointed in 
the opposite direction (e.g., “< < > < <”). The trials on 
which the ﬂanking arrows pointed in the same direction
as the target arrow were the congruent trials; the trials 
in which they pointed in the opposite direction were the 
incongruent trials. Subjects received a total of 80 trials 
(40 congruent and 40 incongruent ones) in a random or-
der, requiring an equal number of left or right responses. 
Prior to the experiment subjects received 12 practice 
trials that were not analyzed. The Eriksen ﬂanker task
lasted approximately 10 min.
Data analysis
For both tasks, each trial was classiﬁed according to its
congruency (C or I) and the congruency of the previous 
trial (c or i), yielding four unique transitions. We per-
formed a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on the percentages correct 
with trial type (congruent vs. incongruent), previous trial 
type (congruent vs. incongruent), and task (ﬂanker or
Simon) as factors. We applied the following restriction: 
If there were two or more consecutive errors, we only in-
cluded the ﬁrst one and we did not analyze the consecu-
tive one(s). We also examined repetition effects in the
Conditional accuracy
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RT data to rule out possible speed-accuracy trade-offs.
 For construction of the CAFs, we ﬁrst classiﬁed each
subject’s RTs into 100-ms bins. For each subject and for 
each transition we computed the mean percentage of 
correct responses in each bin. These percentages were 
then averaged across all subjects, resulting in the CAFs. 
Although in principle one could construct CAFs spanning 
the entire RT-range, an upper and lower limit to the RT-
bins was set. The upper limit was motivated by our ob-
servation that RTs greater than 600 ms for all conditions 
had reached near-perfect levels of accuracy and were 
no longer informative. We will therefore plot, for both 
tasks, CAFs only up to the > 700 ms-bin. The lower limit 
was deemed necessary because initial inspection of the 
results revealed that extremely fast RTs were very rare. 
So if, for example, there was only one subject who made 
a response below 100 ms, and if this happened to be the 
correct response, the CAF would give an accuracy level 
of 100% for this bin, which is clearly nonsensical. We de-
cided to construct CAFs for the ﬂanker task starting from
the RT-bin of 300 to 400 ms, and for the spatial conﬂict
task for the RT-bin of 200 to 300 ms. Observations below 
these boundaries were considered too infrequent; for the 
ﬂanker task there were 27 errors out of a total of 2610
(1.03%) in the 100 to 300-ms RT range, whereas for the 
Simon task there were 21 errors out of a total of 2800 
(0.75%) in the 100 to 200-ms range.
RESULTS
Due to technical problems the Simon data of 5 subjects 
and the ﬂanker data of 3 different subjects were not
stored on the computer. In addition, the ﬂanker data of
1 subject were discarded due to an extremely high er-
ror rate (63% errors in the incongruent condition). The 
mean percentages correct for both tasks, as a function of 
trial type and previous trial type are shown in Figure 1.
 The ANOVA revealed the following effects: There 
was a main effect of task, F(1, 128) = 121.3, p < .001, 
indicating that performance on the ﬂanker task was
more accurate than performance on the Simon task (97 
vs. 93% correct, respectively). Next, there was a main 
effect of trial type, F(1, 128) = 118.2, p < .001. This 
was due to the expected effect of trial type: Accuracy 
was higher with congruent trials than incongruent ones 
(97.3  vs. 93.1%). Also the main effect of previous 
trial type was signiﬁcant, F(1, 128) = 31.4, p < .001. 
This effect indicates that accuracy for a given trial was 
higher when the previous trial was an incongruent one 
than a congruent one. Two interactions were signiﬁcant:
The two-way interaction of trial type and previous trial 
type was signiﬁcant, F(1, 128) = 125.8, p < .001, which 
was modulated by the three-way interaction of task, 
trial type, and previous trial type, F(1, 128) = 55.9, p 
< .001. The two-way interaction indicates that cC trials 
were more accurate than iC trials, and that iI trials were 
more accurate than cI trials. In other words, congruency 
repetition leads to more accurate performance than con-
gruency change.
 The three-way interaction suggests that this ben-
eﬁt was task dependent, which we tested by performing
separate ANOVAs for each task. For the ﬂanker task the
two-way interaction of trial type and previous trial type 
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 132) = 25.7, p < .001. Using a post-
hoc test we found that iI transitions were more accurate 
Figure 1. 
Mean percentage of correct responses for the ﬂanker task and the spatial conﬂict task for congruent and incongruent trials, as a 
function of the preceding trial type (C = Congruent, I = Incongruent).
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than cI transitions, T(132) = 5.45, p < .001, but that cC 
transitions were not more accurate than iC transitions ( 
p > .1). For the spatial conﬂict task the same interaction
was also signiﬁcant, F(1, 131) = 131.8, p < .001. Using 
a post-hoc test we found that iI transitions were more 
accurate than cI transitions, T(131) = 9.54, p < .001, 
and also that cC transitions were more accurate than 
iC transitions, T(131) = 8.35, p < .001. Another way of 
looking at this interaction is by examining what happens 
to the beneﬁt of congruent trials over incongruent ones
when in both cases the previous trial was incongruent. 
Using a paired t-test, we found in the ﬂanker task the
expected higher accuracy for congruent trials than for 
incongruent trials when they were preceded by an incon-
gruent trial, T(132) = 5.58, p < .001. However, this ef-
fect was reversed for the spatial conﬂict task: Congruent
trials resulted in lower accuracy than incongruent trials 
when preceded by an incongruent trial, T(131) = 3.52, 
p < .001. In sum, congruency repetition yielded overall 
more accurate performance, and this effect was more 
prominent in the spatial conﬂict task than the ﬂanker
task.
 The temporal dynamics of these effects can also be 
seen from the conditional accuracy functions, shown in 
Figure 2a (ﬂanker task) and Figure 2b (spatial conﬂict
task). First, as can be seen from both ﬁgures, accuracy
sharply increased with increasing RT, attaining near-per-
fect levels at about 600 ms. Thus, the observed effects 
of trial type and previous trial type on accuracy originate 
mainly in the fast RT-regions. Second, the tasks differed 
with respect to congruency repetition effects. For the 
spatial conﬂict task, congruency repetition yielded un-
ambiguously more accurate performance on fast trials 
than congruency change. For the ﬂanker task, however,
only iI transitions yielded better performance than cI 
transitions, whereas there was no difference between iC 
and cC transitions. Third, for the ﬂanker task the accura-
cy for incongruent trials that are preceded by congruent 
Figure 2. 
Mean percentage of correct responses as a function of RT-bin, for the ﬂanker task (A, top) and the spatial conﬂict task (B, bot-
tom), for each of the four congruency transitions.
Table 1. 
Reaction time (in milliseconds; standard errors in parentheses) as a function of task (ﬂanker vs. spatial conﬂict), trial type,
and previous trial type.
Task Flanker Spatial conﬂict
Previous trial type Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Trial type Congruent 552 (8) 574 (10) 452 (6) 498 (8)
Incongruent 674 (10) 658 (10) 521 (6) 492 (7)
Conditional accuracy
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trials obtained with the fastest RT bin is 26.2%, which 
is well below chance level, T(41) = 3.81, p < .001. The 
accuracy level for iI trials at the same RT bin is 43.4%, 
which did not statistically differ from 50%. For the spatial 
conﬂict task, in contrast, accuracy for the cI trials at the
fastest bin does not drop below chance level. The ac-
curacy level for this subcondition is 46%, which is not 
statistically different from 50%.
 The ANOVA on the RTs revealed a two-way interac-
tion of trial type and previous trial type, indicating an 
overall congruency repetition beneﬁt, F(1, 128) = 144.9, 
p < .001. This interaction was modulated by the three-
way interaction of task, trial type, and previous trial 
type, F(1, 128) = 23.0, p < .001. Examination of the cell 
means revealed this was due to the fact that the congru-
ency repetition beneﬁt was larger for the spatial conﬂict
task than for the ﬂanker task (38 vs. 19 ms, see Table
1). Another way of looking at the data is in terms of the 
size of the reduction of the congruency effect, following 
an incongruent trial. For the ﬂanker task the congruency
effect dropped from 122 ms (following a congruent trial) 
to 84 ms (following an incongruent trial), resulting in a 
net reduction of 38 ms. For the Simon task, however, the 
reduction of the congruency effect was nearly twice as 
large, dropping from 69 ms to 6 ms, resulting in a net 
reduction of 75 ms. The overall pattern of RTs is quite 
similar to the accuracy scores, especially as regards 
repetition scores. This indicates that there is no reason 
to suspect subjects had engaged in a speed-accuracy 
trade-off.
DISCUSSION
In this experiment a group of 137 children, aged 12, per-
formed two well-known response interference tasks: the 
spatial conﬂict task and the Eriksen ﬂanker task. Both
tasks involve an easy (congruent) condition and a more 
difﬁcult (incongruent) condition. Congruent conditions
yielded more accurate performance than incongruent 
conditions, but only in trials with fast response speed 
(RTs < 600 ms). In addition, in both tasks we found that 
the probability of producing a correct response for a 
given trial was somewhat higher when subjects had just 
encountered an incongruent trial than a congruent one, 
again only with the fast responses. Furthermore, congru-
ency repetition (cC and iI trials) resulted in overall more 
accurate performance than trials involving congruency 
change (cI and iC). The congruency repetition effect on 
accuracy was also more pronounced in the spatial con-
ﬂict task than in the ﬂanker task. This beneﬁt was due
to the fact that in the spatial conﬂict task both cC transi-
tions and iI transitions were more accurate than their 
counterparts (cI and iC), whereas in the ﬂanker task only
cC transitions resulted in superior performance.
 These accuracy data mirror previous ﬁndings on
sequential trial effects on RT that were also larger in the 
spatial conﬂict task (Gratton et al., 1992; Valle-Inclán, 
Hackley, & McClay, 1998; Valle-Inclán et al., 2002). 
Apparently, subjects’ level of processing selectivity is 
not constant across the experiment, but ﬂuctuates on
the basis of the preceding trial. More speciﬁcally, after
an incongruent trial subjects tend to pay more attention 
to the task-relevant stimulus, resulting in fewer errors 
during fast responses, whereas after a congruent trial 
subjects are more prone to base their response on task-
irrelevant information (location or ﬂankers), yielding
somewhat more errors. Furthermore, subjects beneﬁt
more from such modiﬁcations in processing selectivity in
the spatial conﬂict task than in the ﬂanker task.
 With respect to the proﬁles of the CAFs, the tasks
yielded somewhat diverging results. For the ﬂanker task,
we observed the predicted accuracy drop below 50% for 
the very fast incongruent trials that were preceded by 
congruent trials, which indicates that subjects base their 
fast responses on the identity of the ﬂankers, instead of
the target. This results in below chance performance on 
incongruent trials, whereas performance on the very fast 
congruent trials is already near-perfect. For the spatial 
conﬂict trials, however, accuracy never dropped below
chance level. Even at the fastest RTs subjects do not 
base their response on the task-irrelevant location of the 
stimulus. 
 This clear cut task difference contrasted with the ex-
pectations derived from the two-phase stimulus process-
ing model for interference tasks proposed by Gratton 
et al. (1992). This model would have predicted below-
chance performance on fast responses in both tasks, at 
least when the interference effect in both tasks occurs 
in the same processing steps. The discrepancy between 
the tasks could be due to differences in the way task-ir-
relevant information is processed. In the ﬂanker task the
ﬂankers are always processed in parallel with the target
along the same channel, as put forward by the continu-
ous ﬂow model of information processing (e.g., Gratton et 
al., 1992). Initially, ﬂanker information is more dominant
and directly primes the corresponding response output. 
If subjects have just encountered a congruent trial they 
are likely to emit their response based on this parallel 
phase, leading to fast errors. With the spatial conﬂict
task, in contrast, target information (identity) and task 
irrelevant target location are processed along separate 
routes that converge at the response selection stage. 
Based on the congruency level of the preceding trial, the 
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automatic route will either receive extra activation (when 
the previous trial was congruent), or the route will be 
temporarily suppressed (as when the previous trial was 
incongruent). In other words, response activation and 
repetition effects seem to occur more downstream in the 
ﬂanker task than in the spatial conﬂict task. This hypoth-
esis is supported by electromyographic (EMG) studies 
that examined the stage at which conﬂict arises. Burle, 
Possamaï, Vidal, Bonnet, and Hasbroucq (2002) argued 
that in the ﬂanker task response conﬂict may occur at
the level of the peripheral motor system, whereas in the 
spatial conﬂict task conﬂict seems to be localized more
upstream.
 In sum, we have demonstrated that accuracy data 
on the spatial conﬂict and ﬂanker task share impor-
tant similarities. This is in line with recent data from 
brain imaging studies  (Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss, 
Thomas, & Posner, 2003) that found that these tasks 
engage the same region of the anterior cingulate cor-
tex. Furthermore, Kunde and Wühr (2006) investigated 
sequential modulations in the spatial conﬂict task and
the Eriksen ﬂanker task, and based on their analyses
they concluded that the tasks share important control 
functions. We replicated the evidence for below-chance 
performance in the early processing stage in the ﬂanker
task, where the incongruent ﬂankers seem to dominate
the motor response tendency, at least when preceded 
by a congruent trial. In the spatial conﬂict task, no such
below-chance performance in the early processing stage 
was found. Despite their similarities, subtle differences 
remain in these tasks in the nature of interference and 
sequential trial effects. We argue that these differences 
are likely due to whether task-irrelevant information is 
processed along the same route as the target (as in the 
ﬂanker task) or along a separate route, as in the spatial
conﬂict task.
Footnotes
1 Actually, Gratton et al. (1992) identiﬁed an additional
third phase, even prior to the parallel phase: As soon 
as the visual onset reaches threshold, subjects can in 
principle emit a response in the complete absence of 
information on the identity of the elements. Subjects 
thus simply guess, meaning that – on the extremely fast 
RTs – accuracy on both congruent trials and incongru-
ent ones is at chance level. But given that this type of 
response is extremely rare, we will not deal with this 
“guessing phase” in the present study.
2 The purpose of examining twin data is that it allows 
one to test whether differences in a given trait (cogni-
tive or behavioral) are due to genetic differences or 
environmental differences, such as upbringing. By ex-
amining the patterns of twin correlations on a range of 
measures, it is possible to quantify the heritability of a 
given trait, which can be deﬁned as the proportion of
phenotypic variance that is explained by genetic variance 
(for details, see Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & McGufﬁn, 
2001). In the current study and in the Nieuwenhuis et al. 
(2006) study, we did not examine individual differences 
in cognitive performance for the following reason: Many 
measures that are of interest to cognitive psychology 
are based on difference scores, for instance, the time 
difference or accuracy difference between two or more 
conditions. However, a psychometric property of differ-
ence scores (such as the size of the ﬂanker effect) is that
they tend to have low reliabilities. This, in turn, results 
in low twin correlation values, which thus limits the use 
of difference scores in genetic analysis (see also Stins, 
Polderman, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2005).
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